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INTRODUCTION

In 1972, the New York Times quoted the New York City
Correction Commissioner as follows: " 'All men are redeemable. Every man can be rehabilitated, and it's up to us in the
community and in the field of criminal justice to see that this is
done.' " 1 Today, few public officials would make such a statement.2 Further, few corrections officials consider themselves in
the business of rehabilitating offenders.
Beginning in the 1960s and culminating in the 1970s, influential judges3 and scholars4 urged the abandonment of rehabilitation as a goal of punishment. Critics focused on both the
philosophical and the factual failures of rehabilitation. They
challenged the underlying assumption of rehabilitation that
criminals were sick and in need of treatment. They criticized the
practices spawned by the model, like indeterminate sentencing
that allowed incarceration as long as necessary to "cure" the
offender. They urged the abandonment of parole because it led
to uncertainty about an actual release date and to unfairness
since parole decisions were not based on meaningful guidelines.
Critics frequently cited studies of rehabilitation programs and
urged that rehabilitation did not work.~
In less than two decades, almost everyone involved in the
criminal justice system has rejected the rehabilitative ideal,
described less than twenty years ago as the predominant justification of punishment. 6 By the mid-1980s, a major criminal law
1. Tolchin, Malcolm, a Black, Named Correction Chief by Mayor, N.Y. Times, Jan.
20, 1972, at 1, reprinted in M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER
91 (1973).
2 . President Bush's use of the Willie Horton issue in his presidential campaign
demonstrates the public's view of rehabilitation and the potential political cost of
advocating early release for criminal offenders. For a discussion of the role of the Willie
Horton advertisements in the 1988 presidential election campaign, see J. GERMOND & J .
WITCOVER, WHOSE BROAD STRIPES AND BRIGHT STARS?: THE TRIVIAL PURSUIT OF
THE PRESIDENCY, 1988, at 10-12 (1989) (describing the Bush campaign's use of its
perception of Governor Dukak.is as soft on crime).
3. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, supra note I, at 86-102.
4 . See generally J. FEINBERG, DoiNG AND DESERVING JUSTICE (1970); R. SINGER,
JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT (1979); THE
TwENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIM. SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN
PUNISHMENT (1976) (hereinafter FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT]; A. VON H IRSCH,
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
5. See discussion infra notes 55-111 and accompanying text.
6. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 23 (1972) ("There has
been more of a commitment to the 'rehabilitative ideal' in recent years than to other
theories of punishment.") (citation omitted).
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treatise concluded that "retribution . . . 'is suddenly being seen
by thinkers of all political persuasions as perhaps the strongest
ground ... upon which to base a system of punishment.' " 7
Critics of rehabilitation have succeeded in the legislature as
well. Initially begun in the late 1970s, efforts to abandon indeterminate sentences and parole succeeded in 1984 when Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act, 8 which set up a
federal sentencing commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines. Similar guidelines were already in place in a number of
states. 9 Several states have even enacted laws making parole
unavailable for those convicted of certain offenses, thereby
lengthening the minimum sentence to be served. 10
This Article urges that we rethink our rejection of the rehabilitative ideal. In the first section, I review some of the major
texts that led to the abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal and
highlight the major arguments against the rehabilitative model.
In the second section of the Article, I challenge the factual assertion that rehabilitation does not work. An emerging body of
expert opinion demonstrates that the picture is more complex
than portrayed by those who urged the abandonment of rehabilitation and parole. In fact, rehabilitation works in certain settings with some offenders. In the third section of the Article, I
attempt to make a positive case for rehabilitation and parole.
Critics of the rehabilitative model equated it with a deterministic
medical model, its modem manifestation, and argued that it was
inconsistent with other justifications of punishment. This Arti7. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 26 (2d. ed. 1986) (quoting Gardner,
The Renaissance ofRetribution-An Examination of Doing Justice , 1976 W1s. L. REV. 781,
784).
8. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted as chapter II of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988 (1984)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586, 3621-3625, 3742 (1988) & 28 U.S.C.A.
§§ 991-998 (West Supp. 1990)).
9. See, e.g. , MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09 (West Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.94A.Ol0-.910 (1988 & Supp. 1989); see also R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 137-94
(canvassing state sentencing reform).
10. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:966 (West 1989) (life imprisonment for
distribution of heroin without benefit of parole); MoNT. CoDE ANN. § 45-9-10 I (1990); see
also R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 57-58 (canvassing state sentencing reform, he observes that
"(e]ven a casual glance at the statutes that have already been passed in some states ... will
demonstrate the acuity of those who mistrust legislative sentencing" because legislators are
likely to enact Draconian provisions to assure re-election), 137-94. Some scholars warned
that urging sentencing reform based on a theory of just desert would give legislatures an
invitation to increase punishment. See, e.g., Clear, Correctional Policy, Neo-Retributionism
and the Determinate Sentence, 4 JuST. SYS. J. 26 (1978).
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conservatives were no doubt delighted when they were joined by
liberals and radicals in calling for the abolition of the rehabilitative model. 16 For example, Senator Kennedy wrote in 1978 that
"[s]entencing in America today [under a scheme dominated by a
rehabilitative philosophy] is a national scandal. Every day our
system of sentencing breeds massive injustice." 17 Kennedy's
statement echoed the strong indictment found in the radical
Quaker document Struggle for Justice. 18 Despite the Quakers'
early role in establishing the rehabilitative model in America,
the authors wrote that "[a]fter more than a century of persistent
failure, this reformist prescription is bankrupt." 19
The critique of the rehabilitative model focused on a
number of its manifestations: "The objects of this attack are
sentencing discretion, the indeterminate sentence, the parole
function, the uses of probation in cases of serious criminality,
and even allowances of 'good time' credit in the prisons. " 20 By
the late 1970s, a startling number of books and articles endorsed
a retributive, just-deserts model of punishment and rejected the
rehabilitative model. 21 Authors disagreed about a variety of
themes, including whether an offender's background was relevant to measure his culpability, whether just deserts could be
carefully computed into fixed sentences, and whether a justdeserts model imposed a moral obligation to punish or was
merely a limiting principle. 22 But the authors agreed that rehabilitation did not work and that retribution in one manifestation
or another was relevant to why we punish. 23
In this section, I do not intend to canvass the ongoing
debate among those advancing the argument in favor of a theory
of just deserts. Instead, I want to highlight the common critique
16. In their introduction to Doing Justice, Willard Gay1in and David J. Rothman
observe that the rehabilitative model has "always [been] under attack from the conservative
community, to which it had appeared as a mollycoddling, bleeding-heart outrage, and now
we (prominent liberals] find ourselves, for different reasons, with different motives, joining
the argument for its abandonment." Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 11, at xxxvii.
17. Kennedy, Introduction to Symposium on Sentencing (pt. 1), 7 HOFSTRA L. REv.
1, I (1978).
18. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 8 (1971).
19. Id
20. F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 8 (1981).
21. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4; see also N. MORRIS, supra note 11;
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 25.
22. See, e.g., R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 11-34 (discussing different philosophical
justifications and variations of just-desert theories).
23. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 7, at 28-29; see also F. ALLEN, supra note
20, at 65-66 (identifying decline of rehabilitative ideal and Jack of new paradigm).
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of the rehabilitation model by reference to some of the early and
influential texts taking the model to task.
A.

The Rehabilitative Model
The rehabilitative model has not always been associated
with a deterministic medical model of human behavior. But by
the 1960s, a growing faith in psychiatry and science had strongly
influenced penology. 24 Based on a perception of the criminal as
sick and in need of treatment or rehabilitation, legislatures
entrusted to judges wide latitude in imposing indeterminate
sentences: if the offender is ill and in need of treatment, his sentence ought to be conditioned on his cure. 25 Parole boards, in
effect, helped to administer indeterminate sentences by determining when the "patient, was cured. 26
In the current debate, the medical model seems readily
open to attack. 27 Nonetheless, that it was recently a powerful
model of criminal behavior is demonstrated by the Supreme
Court's opinion in Powell v. Texas. 28 In Powell, the Court was
faced with a claim that the eighth amendment prohibited a state
from criminalizing a defendant, suffering from chronic alcoholism, for being " 'found in a state of intoxication in a public
place.' , 29
In a four-Justice dissent, which appears to have been
drafted initially as a majority opinion, 30 Justice Fortas argued
first that alcoholism is a disease and that " 'alcoholism is not
24. Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 11, at xxxvii; F. ALLEN, supra note 20, at 7.
25. M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 89-90; R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 1-2; STRUGGLE
FOR Jus-neE, supra note 18, at 10 ("Instead of building pride and self-confidence, [the
rehabilitative process] tries to persuade its subjects ... that they are sick."); see also id. at
40-41.

26. M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 87.
27. See, e.g., F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25-41 (1964); M.
FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 89-90.
28. 392 u.s. 514 (1968).
29. /d. at 517 (quoting TEX. PENAL CoDE ANN. art. 477 (Vernon 1952) (current
version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.08 (Vernon 1974)).
30. As developed below, although Justice White concurred in the judgment of the
Court, he agrees with the central thesis of the dissent, that a state violates the eighth
amendment when it punishes a person for yielding to an irresistable compulsion. Powell,
392 U.S. at 548 (White, J., concurring). Hence, a majority of the Court subscribed to the
critical aspects of the theory of the dissent, suggesting that Justice White may have changed
his vote on narrow grounds after initially agreeing with the dissent. That view is supported
by the style of the plurality and dissents. Justice Marshall's plurality opinion is shaped by
his efforts to respond to the positively stated thesis of the dissent. Unlike the usual majority
and dissent, the clear statement of the facts and issue are found in the dissent, rather than
in the plurality.
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within the control of the person involved.' " 31 Further, he read
the Court's earlier holding in Robinson v. California 32 as having
held that "[c]riminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change," and he
characterized the addict in Robinson as "powerless to choose not
to violate the law." 33 While Robinson addressed a statute that
criminalized a person for the status of being an addict,34 Justice
Fortas would have extended its holding to Powell because "the
particular defendant was accused of being in a condition which
he had no capacity to change or avoid." 3s The dissent did not
limit the eighth amendment prohibition to status offenses.
According to the dissent, an offender could raise an eighth
amendment challenge if he could show that the act he committed is "part of the pattern of his disease and is occasioned by a
compulsion symptomatic of the disease. " 36
Justice White's concurring opinion demonstrates that a fifth
vote may have been close at hand: "For some ... alcoholics I
would think a showing could be made that resisting drunkenness
is impossible and that avoiding public places when intoxicated is
also impossible. " 37 If those alcoholics were criminalized for that
conduct, Justice White would have found a violation of the
eighth amendment. He, too, was ready to accept the view that
strongly compelled conduct, the product of a disease but short of
insanity, could not be criminalized. 38 He found the record inadequate to show that Powell "was unable to stay off the streets on
the night in question. " 39
Other evidence demonstrates the strong hold that at least
the myth of the medical model held for many observers of the
criminal justice system. During the 1950s and until the late
1960s, the D .C. Circuit initially expanded,40 and then experi31. ld. at 562 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (quoting A . ULLMAN, To KNow THE
DIFFERENCE 22 (1960)).
32. 370 u.s. 660 (1962).
33. Powell, 392 U.S. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
34. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660-61 n.1 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE§ 11,721
(West 1964) (repealed 1972) (current version at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 11,550
(West 1983)).
35. Powell, 391 U.S. at 568 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
36. /d. at 569.
37. /d. at 551 (White, J., concurring).
38. /d. at 551-52.
39. /d. at 554.
40. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled in United
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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mented41 with, the appropriate role of psychiatric testimony in
cases involving the insanity defense. The court also faced other
challenges that demonstrated the currency of the medical
model. 42
Probably because of limited resources and doubt about the
validity of coerced therapy,43 we never fully implemented treatment programs in prison. Even in the era that demonstrated
great public interest and confidence in rehabilitation, actual
resources remained minimal.44 Given high hope and few
resources, corrections officials experimented with drug therapy,
psychosurgery, and behaviorial conditioning45-"methods
which [would] alter criminal behavior patterns but which [were]
minimally dependent on prisoner cooperation. " 46
Despite a lack of commitment of resources, the medical
model had powerful sway within the criminal justice system. It
influenced legal doctrine, from the role of the forensic psychiatrist to the meaning of the eighth amendment. Further, it influenced legislation and penology.
B.

The Critique of Rehabilitation and the Medical Model

1. The Plurality in Powell v. Texas
Justice Marshall's plurality opinion in Powell v. Texas 47
articulated the concerns of those who later rejected the medical,
rehabilitative model. He urged caution when the law attempts
to import "scientific and medical models into a legal system generally predicated upon a different set of assumptions." 48 Absent
an available, proven, effective treatment, a chronic alcoholic
41. See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (attempting
to define "product" of mental disease to prevent medical experts from dominating the
determination about insanity); Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
(establishing "but for" requirement for "product" test).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (rejecting
argument that it was unconstitutional to convict the appellant of possession of heroin
because he had "an overpowering need to use heroin"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973);
United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.) (rejecting claim that defendant's lack
of control, caused by his "rotten social background," but short of legal insanity, should be a
defense), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972).
43. Gobert, Psychosurgery, Conditioning and the Prisoner's Right to Refuse
"Rehabilitation," 61 VA. L. REv. 155, 158-60 (1975).
44. /d. at 158-59 (citing such practices as teaching only obsolete job skills).
45. /d
46. /d. at 161.
47. 392 U .S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion).
48. /d. at 526.
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might find himself civilly committed for treatment for an indefinite period, awaiting treatment that cannot be provided. 49 A
prisoner gained little by having crime converted to disease if he
could be incarcerated and treated until cured, especially given
the imperfect art of treatment. so
Marshall doubted what appeared to be an underlying
assumption of the dissent that the purpose of penal sanctions
was rehabilitiation. He articulated a doubt that would soon
become obvious to all: "it can hardly be said with assurance that
incarceration serves [therapeutic or rehabilitative] purposes ...
for the general run of criminals."s 1
Ultimately, the criminal law's flirtation with the medical
model proved too much. While the dissent suggested that it
would limit its rule to a chronic alcoholic's compulsion to
drink,s2 Justice Marshall was quick to challenge the dissent's
attempt to limit its own principle. He characterized the dissent's
statement that its principle would not be applied, for example,
" 'in the case of offenses such as driving a car while intoxicated,
assault, theft, or robbery,'" as "limitation by fiat."s 3 The medical model attempts to explain behavior in causal terms without
reference to the individual's will. But if all aberrant behavior is
caused by "compulsion" or "exceedingly strong influence,''
there is little room left for the traditional assumptions of the
criminal law. At root, the plurality was not ready to "cast aside
... concepts .. . [of] moral accountability."s4
The concerns articulated in Marshall's plurality opinion
would soon be picked up by a wide range of critics of the rehabilitative model.
2. Struggle for Justice: The Modern Quaker View
Struggle for Justice, ss a widely read and influential working
paper prepared for the American Friends Service Committee,
presented a radical attack on the rehabilitative model. While
49. /d. at 527 ("There is as yet no known generally effective method for treating the
vast number of alcoholics in our society.").
SO. /d. at 529.
51. /d. at 530.
52. /d. at 558-59 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
53. /d. at 534 (quoting id. at 559 n.2 (Fortas, J., dissenting)).
54. /d. at 535-36; see a/so, e.g., S. KADISH, B LAME AND PUNISHMENT 103 (1987)
(rationality of the actor provides basis for blame even where compulsion to violate the law
is strong).
55. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 18.
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their Quaker ancestors had been instrumental in developing the
rehabilitative model, the authors repudiated that position in no
uncertain terms. For example, in commenting on the work of
Quaker prison reformer Elizabeth Fry, Struggle for Justice
stated that "[although] we share her faith in the importance of
.. . human reaching out to those in dire trouble[, t]his admiration ... must not keep us from an honest evaluation of the longrange significance of the institutional reforms she promoted. "~6
That evaluation was harsh:
Her work and its outcome is a paradigm of the drama that critics and administrators of the penal system have played over
and over again: the critic attacks, devising something that
seems better; the administrator co-opts the critic and implements the idea in ways and for ends quite at odds with the
original intention. . . .
. .. Much penal reform has been infected with . .. paternalistic motives, which probably goes far to explain why most
reform programs are so easily adapted to serve the perpetuation of the system. ~7

More specifically, the system of indeterminate sentences and
parole failed because "managers of the correctional establishment" used indeterminacy "as a tool of institutional control. "~ 8
Further, they used indeterminacy to increase "the power of the
state to lengthen a prisoner's sentence. "~9
The authors identified a class bias in a scheme that emphasized making the penalty fit the criminal, not the crime: society
thought the most serious forms of criminality involved, in part,
the "challenge to the cultural norm[s]." 60 The authors argued
that "the significance of conventional crime - theft, killing,
pickpocketing, prostitutions[,] robbery - lay less in the violent
or acquisitive act itself than in its challenge to the cultural
norm." 61
The authors saw the rehabilitative model as a product of a
class society. That model ignored a retributive theory of justice
56. Id. at 17.
57. Id. at 17-18. As developed below, much the same thing might be said for the
reformist goals of the drafters of Struggle for Justice. Their efforts led to the abandonment
of rehabilitation as a goal, but rather than Jess incarceration, we face calls for more punitive
sanctions. See infra text accompanying notes 96-99.
58. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 28.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 29.
61. Id.
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because lower class crime was "petty in its direct costs" by comparison to white-collar crime, committed by "exploiters, who
extracted hundreds of thousands of dollars from the defenseless. " 62 A treatment-oriented system allowed the moral
hypocrites to mollycoddle upper- and middle-class criminals
because, although they are "morally weak and psychologically
deficient, . .. they are not revolutionaries." 63 Surely, a fallen
member of the ruling class will need less reformative treatment
than a member of the lower class who has not had the same
advantages. Struggle for Justice thus aligned radicals with lawand-order advocates in their distaste for parole and rehabilitation. For radicals, these systems were shams through which
society favored the rich over the poor.
Efforts at reform were viewed as paternalistic and coercive.
By what moral right did a corrupt society attempt to reform revolutionaries?64 Many observers were quick to agree: we witnessed the criminalization of civil rights workers in the South
and draft resisters throughout the United States. 65 These were
people of conscience, political dissidents with the strength of
conviction to face violence and imprisonment based on profound
religious and moral convictions. Such people of conscience
might be willing to accept their just deserts for violating the law,
but they certainly were not suitable subjects for reformation and
rehabilitation. Struggle for Justice did not attempt to distinguish
crimes of violence, like robbery, from crimes of conscience. 66
What made Struggle for Justice a compelling document,
cited by numerous less radical commentators who picked up its
reformist spirit, 67 was not only its passionate political critique.
After all, it was advocating abandonment of a positive view of
humanity, the belief in our capacity for reform or transforma62. /d. at 30. The analysis ignores the psychological cost of crimes of violence
against the victim. The 1970s and 1980s also saw heightened attention to the victims of
violent crime, powerful voices that would increase pressure to punish criminal offenders.
See, e.g., F. CARRINGTON, THE VICTIMS (1975); S. EsTRJCH, REAL RAPE (1987); L.
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984).
63. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 30.
64. See, e.g., id. at 100-23 (discussing repressive function of the criminal law).
65. See, e.g., Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 17, at xxxili; R . SINGER, supra note 4, at

6.
66. See STRUGGLE FOR JuSTICE, supra note 18, at 29-31 (analysis on basis of class,
rather than on whether crime had a victim).
67. See, e.g., R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 8 n.22; FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT,
supra note 4, at 98 n.20; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 4 n.6; Dershowitz, Indeterminate
Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm , 123 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 301 n .8 (1974).
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tion from evil to good, reflected in the early conception of rehabilitation. Ultimately, Struggle for Justice was compelling
because it could point to the empirical propostion that parole
and rehabilitation simply did not work. 68
3.

Judge Frankel's Criminal Sentences: A Moderate Critique

Judge Marvin Frankel's Criminal Sentences 69 espoused
many of the same themes articulated in Struggle for Justice, but
in a more moderate voice. He did not articulate the same
assumptions about the class structure of the criminal justice system. But he too used powerful rhetoric to describe the rehabilitative system. He portrayed "evils [that] ... are grim[,] ...
unbearable by any society that styles itself civilized." 70
The first evil was "the almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning of sentences[,] ...
intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of
law." 71 Sentencing judges were not only given wide latitude in
choosing a sentence, but they were also given no guidance in
how to exercise that discretion. 72
Criminal Sentences tied the lack of guidance to a fundamental failure of Congress and state legislatures to ask "the most
basic of the questions affecting criminal penalties, the questions
of justification and purpose." 73 Thus, judges were free to determine a sentence based on their own ideas about why we punish.
Frankel and others have doubted that judges have adequate
training or time to make principled sentencing decisions.74 The
result of the then-applicable scheme was not surprising:
"untrained, untested, unsupervised men armed with great power
will perpetrate abuses. " 75 Potential for abuse was further compounded by "walls of silence," "[t]he absence of any explanation
68. See STRUGGLE FOR }US"r!CE, supra note 18, at 83-99.
69. M. FRANKEL, supra note 1.
70. /d. at ix.
71. /d. at S.
72. /d. at 7.
73. /d. Even where legislatures do state purposes of punishment, problems remain:
for example, a sentencing judge or commission must deal with situations in which those
purposes conflict. One of the best examples of such a conflict is found in an articulate
opinion by Judge Frankel in United States v. Bergman, 416 F . Supp. 496 (S.D .N.Y. 1976).
Frankel found no need to incarcerate for specific deterrence, but felt compelled by other
purposes of punishment to sentence the 64-year-old defendant to a term of imprisonment.
74. M. FRANKEL, supra note I, ch. 2.
75. /d. at 17.
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or purported justification for the sentence." 76
Frankel singled out indeterminate sentences for special criticism. While recognizing that "[t)he case for the indeterminate
sentence rests .. . upon a laudable concern for each unique individual, " 77 he rejected the idea of criminals as "sick" and in need
of a "cure," as "genetically flawed and malformed."78 He disputed the idea that many normal criminals are fit candidates for
treatment. More importantly, he doubted the existence of a cure
for the disease, making suspect indeterminate sentences that
incarcerate until the sick prisoner is cured. 79 Lacking a treatment, society is simply warehousing prisoners, who instead of
being cured, are made worse. 80
Frankel identified the cynical belief among prisoners that
the system of parole was largely political. That concern was
especially true in light of the lack of guidelines for parole
officers, who are "assigned without guidance to answer unintelligible questions . . . . We charge [parole boards] to make indeterminate sentences determinate, but we give them no
conceptual or other tools to work with. We set them lofty goals
of rehabilitation, but with no directions or means of achievement. " 81 The result is rage and cynicism among the "alleged
beneficiaries of the rehabilitative ideal. " 82 The system leaves
them unable to plan their time or to discover the rules on how to
secure their release. 83
Judge Frankel did not deny the possibility that some offenders might be rehabilitated. But he rejected the idea that all prisoners were capable of redemption or transformation. 84
Having portrayed a system sufficiently arbitrary to raise
questions about its constitutionality, 8 s Judge Frankel devoted his
final chapter to a proposal for legislative reform. His specific
proposals provided a game plan for Congress when it eventually
created a sentencing commission and empowered it to set up
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
Id.

at 42-43.
at 89.

at
at
at
at
at
/d. at
85. /d. at

90-91.
93.
95.

96.
97.
91.

103.
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sentencing guidelines. 86 Judge Frankel urged articulation of
purposes of punishment, 87 adoption of weights and measures of
factors to determine a sentence, 88 and creation of a permanent
sentencing commission. 89 Unlike Congress when it eventually
passed sentencing reform,90 and unlike many commentators
including the authors of Struggle for Justice, 91 Frankel did not
urge wholesale abandonment of indeterminate sentences. He
specifically observed that in limited contexts rehabilitation and
indeterminate sentences serve a function. 92
4.

Doing Justice

By the mid-1970s, a strong coalition was in place that
would soon challenge the supremacy of the rehabilitative, medical model. Picking up many of the themes in Struggle for Justice
and Criminal Sentences, Doing Justice set the framework for the
debate about punishment over the past decade.
The committee that prepared Doing Justice consisted of
some of the day,s most influential liberals. 93 Although done
with regrets, they recommended the abandonment of the rehabilitative model. 94 They did so for several reasons. The model
was riddled with internal inconsistencies. They preferred a justdeserts model because "[c]ertain things are simply wrong and
ought to be punished.,9 s It is doubtful, however, that they
would have abandoned the rehabilitative model on philosophical
grounds alone. They hesitated to tum their backs on "considerations [of] generosity and charity, compassion and love,, 96 that
they believed were reflected in the rehabilitative ideal.
86. Lindeman, Opening the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Alternatives, 15 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 555, 556 (1989).
87. M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 106.
88. /d. at 111-15.
89. /d. at 118-24.
90. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3624(b) (West Supp. 1990). At the same time that Congress
rejected rehabilitation as the sole basis for sentencing policy, it recognized rehabilitation as
a valid purpose of punishment. /d. § 3553(a)(2)(D). But in the scheme developed by
Congress, amenability to treatment is assessed at the time of sentencing and the scheme
rejects considerations of events subsequent to conviction and incarceration.
91. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 144 (urging fixed sentences, thereby
eliminating "discretion in setting sentences").
92. M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 99-100.
93. See Gaylin & Rothman, supra note II, at vii-ix (listing members of the
committee).
94. /d. at xxxvii.
95. /d. at xxxix; see also A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 45-55.
96. Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 11, at xxxix.
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The committee was deeply troubled by pragmatic considerations. The rehabilitative model "produced unexpected abhorrent consequences and numerous unpredicted side effects that
were less humane or liberal than its proponents had anticipated."97 Outward benevolence led to exploitation of prisoners
in practice. The model led to gross inequities in the length of
criminal sentences for similar conduct. 98 Perhaps most telling in
the committee's view was "[t]he simple fact ... that the experiment has not worked out. " 99
The committee's chapter on rehabilitation programs was
almost as pessimistic as the view of Struggle for Justice. They
rejected the idea that we can blame the failure of rehabilitation
on a lack of resources. Results were discouraging even in jurisdictions like California where programs were "seriously
thought-out and well financed." 100 The committee reviewed a
comprehensive list of treatment programs and concluded not
only that "[t]he quality of many programs has been poor," but
that even where that has not been the case, results have not been
encouraging. 101 They reached their conclusions by examining
their own study, as well as published reports, including the
widely cited works of Robert Martinson. 102 They also doubted
the efficacy of intrusive behavior-control methods and rejected
them on moral grounds even if those methods proved
effective. 103
The committee rejected rehabilitation as the primary justification of punishment. They argued that deterrence was not a
sufficient justification of punishment, although it was indeed relevant "in justifying the existence of the criminal sanction." 104
Ultimately, they endorsed the notion of just deserts and concluded that "[t]hose who violate others' rights deserve
punishment." 105
When they turned to the question of allocation of punish97. /d. at xxxvii.
98. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 101.
99. Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 11, at xxxviii.
!()(). A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 13.
101. /d. at 15.
102. /d. at 152-53 n.4; see also R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 7 (discussing Martinson's
works); FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 4, at 74 n.16 (discussing
Martinson's conclusion that little works).
103. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 17.
104. /d. at 61.
105. /d. at 54.
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ment, as opposed to the justification for punishing, the committee again argued for a theory of just deserts. 106 Unlike
retributivists who would look only to the harm caused, 107 they
believed that the punishment should be commensurate with the
seriousness of the wrong and that it was to be measured "by the
act and ... the degree of the actor's culpability." 108 Doing Justice argued that commensurate deserts determined upper and
lower limits of punishment. To use a theory of just deserts as
setting only an upper limit would create unfairness by treating
some offenders too leniently. 109
The just-deserts model, according to the committee, is at
odds with rehabilitation. Punishment is moralistic and judgmental, while the rehabilitative model demonstrates mercy and
leniency. 110
The texts discussed were not the only influential texts urging a re-examination of punishment and rehabilitation. 111 They
do, however, reflect the unusual political alliance that- soon led
to the abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal. They also reflect
the common themes in the argument against rehabilitation:
treated as synonymous with the medical model, it was based on
mercy, not justice and, therefore, was inconsistent with the criminal law. The model was thus grounded on an erroneous philosophical premise: we do not punish out of beneficence, but
because the punishment is deserved. The rehabilitative model
had also led to indecent inequities in sentencing. Equally important, the common perception was that rehabilitation was a cruel
joke because efforts at rehabilitation were inadequate and, even
when provided, those efforts simply did not work.

106. /d. at 66-76.
107. /d. at 68. For an insightful discussion of the role of resulting harm in
substantive criminal law and in sentencing policy, see generally Schulhofer, Harm and
Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122
U. PA. L. REv. 1497 (1974).
108. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 69. Demonstrating the popular appeal of this
view of retribution or just deserts, the Supreme Court has adopted a similar view of eighth
amendment proportionality. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-86 (1983).
109. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 73.
110. Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 11, at xxxvii-xl.
111 . A bibliography of other related texts can be found in R. SINGER, supra note 4, at
205-11.
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LEGISLATIVE ABANDONMENT OF THE REHABILITATIVE
MODEL

A.

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
By the end of the 1970s, efforts at sentencing reform were
underway. 112 Within the federal system, after an unsuccessful
attempt to pass legislation in the late 1970s, Congress enacted
the Sentencing Reform Act (the Act) as part of the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act. 113 That legislation reflects the
critical view of the rehabilitative model and indeterminate sentencing developed above.
In place of the previous individualized sentencing approach,
the act establishes more determinate or presumptive
sentences. 114 For a given category of offense committed by a
given category of offender, the judge is required to rely on sentencing guidelines to determine an appropriate kind and range of
sentence. 115 The court may deviate from that range only if it
finds aggravating or mitigating circumstances not considered in
the guideline formulation. 116 If the judge imposes a sentence disparate with the guidelines, he must state the reasons for which
he imposed the sentence. 117 The sentence then becomes subject
to appellate review. 118
Also in line with the criticism of the rehabilitative model,
Congress eliminated parole. 119 Because the impetus for the Act
was to make the offender's sentence more definite, retention of
parole would re-introduce an element of uncertainty that the
system was designed to eliminate. 12° Critics of rehabilitation
had argued that prisoners were victimized by uncertainty about
their release date and were subjected to arbitrary treatment
because parole board decisions were unguided by standards. 121
112. An earlier effort at reform is discussed in Kennedy, supra note 17.
113. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted as chapter II of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988 (1984); see
supra note 8.
114. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1989).
115. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3220, 3234.
116. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)-(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1990).
117. 18 U .S.C. § 3553(c) (1988).
118. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(a)-(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1990).
119. /d. § 3624(a)-(b) (a prisoner must complete his sentence, reduced only by
limited "good" time).
120. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 115, at 53, reprinted in 1984 U .S. CODE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3236.
121. L. GOODSTEIN & J. HEPBURN, DETERMINATE SENTENCING AND

1028

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

Advocates of the Act argued that parole was inconsistent
with both deterrence and a theory of just deserts. The fixed
guidelines assured punishment commensurate with the
offender's just deserts. Parole, it was argued, leads to a belief
among offenders that if sentenced to prison, they will be released
quickly on parole. The legislative history also demonstrates the
belief that "almost everyone involved in the criminal justice system now doubts that rehabilitation can be induced reliably in a
prison setting." 122 Finally, once indeterminacy was abandoned
and fixed sentences established, the parole board was no longer
needed to equalize otherwise unfair sentences that might result
from misguided or unguided judges acting under the old scheme
of discretionary sentencing. 123
In many ways, the federal scheme tracks the scheme proposed by critics of the rehabilitative model. Indeterminate
sentences and parole are gone. Following the sentencing guidelines should lead to less inequality among offenders.
The guidelines focus on some individual characteristics of
the offender. 124 This emphasis, however, is distinguished from
the individualized "treatment" under a rehabilitative model.
Further, the just-deserts model can be distinguished from the
disfavored retributive model, which looks only or primarily to
the harm caused by the offender, in that the just-deserts model
considers the culpability of the offender. 125 Hence, some individual characteristics are relevant in assessing the offender's culpability under the federal scheme, but Congress, like many of the
critics of the rehabilitative model, rejects the offender's response
to punishment or to treatment as relevant in determining his
IMPRISONMENT 18-19 (1985); P. O'DoNNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A
JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 10-13
(1977).
122. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 115, at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3221.
123. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1989); see also A1schu1er,
Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed"
and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 553 (1978).
124. For example, the federal sentencing guidelines adjust the sentence according to
some factors relating to offender culpability, like the individual's role in the specific offense
and the acceptance of responsibility. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 3 (1988). Also relevant is the offender's prior
criminal history. /d. ch. 4. Some relevant factors are specifically excluded from
consideration by the court. See id. ch. 5, pt. H (excluding such factors as age, education,
vocational skills, mental condition, family ties, previous employment record).
125. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 68-69.
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release date. 126
One area in which liberal reformers did not prevail was in
actual sentence length. Doing Justice, for example, argued that
one evil resulting from the rehabilitative model was excessive
incarceration. 127 Although it did not present a precise agenda
for sentencing, the committee favored alternatives to incarceration and short periods of incarceration in all but the most serious
cases if imprisonment was necessary. 128 Because of the procedures used by the federal sentencing commission, sentences
imposed under the guidelines are roughly equivalent to actual
sentences served under the preguideline scheme. 129

B.

Other Sentencing Reforms

The reform movement has had an effect on state sentencing
practices as well. But in some instances, state legislatures used
the reformist program to increase sentences. 130 That result probably could have been anticipated. 131 The reformist movement
aligned radicals and liberals with conservative critics of rehabilitation. Yet the reformist platform, reflected in documents like
Doing Justice, included important limitations on punishment.
Once freed from the constraints of the rehabilitative model, lawand-order proponents could advance their own brand of retributive justice. Quite predictably, they would urge longer
sentences. 132
Law-and-order retributive justice can be seen in numerous
statutes that impose long sentences for a host of crimes. Legislatures have imposed life sentences for a variety of crimes, 133 and
they have eliminated all sentencing discretion in other cases, 134
thereby focusing on the harm, not on the culpability of the
126. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3624(b) (West Supp. 1990).
127. Goodell, Preface to A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at xvii.
128. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 91-94.
129. See Lindeman, supra note 86, at 559-60.
130. See R. SINGER, supra note 4, at xvi-xvii, 57-58.
131. See Clear, supra note 10, at 37-41.
132. /d. But see R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 58-59 (defending Doing Justice author
von Hirsch from claim that liberal reformers were partially responsible for trend towards
longer sentences).
133. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 37-2732(a)(1)(A) (1977 & Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 195.200(1), (4) (Vernon 1978) (repealed 1989) (both permitting life imprisonment
for distribution of heroin).
134. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:966 (West 1989) (mandatory life
imprisonment for distribution of heroin).
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offender. 135 They have also relied on sentence enhancement in
cases in which a crime is committed in a particular manner, 136
again largely by reference to the harm caused by the offender,
rather than to the offender's culpability. Legislatures, intent on
convincing the public that they have gotten tough on crime, 137
have also combined long sentences with unavailability of parole
in a variety of contexts. 138 In the recent past, we have also
witnessed shrinking resources for programs to rehabilitate
prisoners. 139
Liberal and radical critics of the rehabilitative model did
not endorse increased sentences and lack of rehabilitative programs within prisons. The sources discussed above, while abandoning the rehabilitative model as a justification for punishment,
specifically urged that prison officials retain training and skill
programs for inmates. 140
At least in retrospect, the shrinking resources for inmate
rehabilitation can be traced to the attack on the rehabilitative
model. While Doing Justice and Struggle for Justice specifically
urged humane services for inmates, they added to the overwhelming public perception that rehabilitation did not work. 141
135. Despite the argument that LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:966 did not allow
consideration of the culpability of the offender, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that § 966 does not violate the eighth amendment. See Terrebonne v.
Butler, 848 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1989).
136. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 84l(b) (West Supp. 1990) (providing for increasing
penalties depending on amount of drugs involved and on prior convictions of the same
offense); id. § 845 (increasing penalty if offender distributes controlled substance to person
under 21 years old); id. § 845(a) (increasing penalty for distribution of controlled substance
within 1000 feet of school or within 100 feet of a playground).
137. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 225, supra note 115, at 225, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3437.
138. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 84l(b) (prescribing mandatory life without release after
two or more convictions under §§ 841, 845, 845(a) or 845(b)); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:966 (West 1989) (mandatory life imprisonment for distribution of heroin).
139. See, e.g., Glidden, Put Inmates to Work, Make Prisons Produce, L.A. Times,
Apr. l, 1990, at M4, col. 1 (corrections system is full of retribution without refonn); For the
Record, Wash. Post, Mar. 8, 1990, at A26 (overcrowded prisons prevent most prisoners
from developing skills that can make them productive citizens upon release); Imprisonment
Inequities, Boston Globe, Mar. 3, 1990, at 18 (once incarcerated, prisoner has little hope of
developing skills); see also Kraar, How to Win the War on Drugs, FORTUNE, Mar. 12, 1990,
at 70 (attention to "war" on drugs, rather than to prospect of treating drug addiction).
140. See, e.g., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 99 (urging availability of
resources to criminal offenders on a voluntary basis). Hirsch has recently argued that
"(t]he sentencing-guidelines movement has .. . paid relatively little heed to community
sanctions." Von Hirsch, Wasik, & Greene, Punishments in the Community and the
Principles of Desert, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 595, 596 (1989).
141. See Clear, supra note 10, at 26.
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In the setting of the 1980s, few legislators or prison officials
would clamor for more rehabilitation in the climate of wide condemnation of rehabilitation that we have witnessed. 142 However,
the central themes of the critique of the rehabilitative model
were only that the model was a failure and that rehabilitation
was not a justification of punishment. 143
Our current situation is disastrous. We have doubled our
prison population. 144 The current debate centers on whether
to privatize prisons or whether to invest billions of dollars in
prison construction. 145 President Bush has urged a major war
on drugs that will predictably lead to longer prison sentences
and greater numbers of inmates. 146 Occasionally commentators
argue that we cannot have a coherent antidrug policy without
greatly expanded treatment facilities. 147 But most of the discussion is tough talk about making war, not about treating or
rehabilitating. 148
In defense of the committees that drafted Doing Justice and
Struggle for Justice, one might argue that their criticisms have
been taken out of context-that their reforms have been coopted. 149 Had their complete agenda been adopted, we would
142. That would appear to be one of the lessons of Governor Dukakis's unsuccessful
presidential campaign. President Bush successfully labelled Dukakis as soft on crime. See
J. GERMOND & } . WtTCOVER, supra note 2, at 10-12.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 16-111.
144. Taylor, Ten Years for Two Ounces, AM. LAW., Mar. 1990, at 65 (federal prison
population has doubled in the past decade); see also Domanick, A Whole Generation is
Being Lost, L.A. Times, Mar. 7, 1990, at B7, col. 1 (prison population in California has
more than tripled in the past decade); McKee, Expert Says Prison Overcrowding Growing
and Guard Recounts Prison Riots (UPI wireservice, Mar. 7, 1990) (NEXIS, Current file)
(prison population in Pennsylvania up Ill% in past decade).
145. See. e.g., Testing the Private Prison Idea, Chi. Trib., Mar. 26, 1990, at 12;
O'Connor, County Warned of$63-Mi//ion Deficit in the Next 2 Years, L.A. Times, Mar. 14,
1990, at Bl, col. S; Page, Can We Rent a Social Conscience?, Chi. Trib., Mar. 11 , 1990, at
C3.
146. See Remarks of President George Bush (Fed. News Serv., Mar. 19, 1990)
(NEXIS, Current file); Kraar, supra note 139, at 70 (suggesting alternatives to building
more prisons); Attorneys General Ask Bush for More Money to Fight Drugs, L.A. Times,
Mar. 20, 1990, at A16, col. 1; Healy, Pentagon Plans $877-Mil/ion Anti-Drug Effort, L.A.
Times, Mar. 10, 1990, at A2, col. I. Congress has already responded by increasing
penalties for various drug violations. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text; see
also Taylor, supra note 144, at 65 (describing case of defendant given mandatory ten-year
prison sentence for peripheral role in small drug deal).
147. See, e.g., Kraar, supra note 139, at 70.
148. See, e.g. , Remarks by President George Bush, supra note 146; Healy, supra note
146, at A2, col. I.
149. See, e.g., R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 57-58. Ironically, Struggle for Justice
observed that earlier reforms have typically been "co-opted" by prison administrators for
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indeed have had a different landscape from the one we now face.
My purpose is not to assess blame for the current state of affairs.
Instead, I want to re-examine the arguments against the rehabilitative model and to argue that we should recommit ourselves to
parole and to rehabilitative programs.
IV.

THE REHABILITATION OF REHABILITATION

The attack on the rehabilitative model focused on three primary themes: one, that rehabilitation simply did not work; two,
that rehabilitation was philosophically unsound; and three, that
the model led to inequality. In the remainder of this Article, I
will examine each of those claims and will conclude that we
should recognize a role in our punishment scheme for rehabilitation and parole.

A.

Rehabilitation May Work

The literature urging the abandonment of parole and rehabilitation argued that rehabilitation did not work. Critics of the
model frequently cited the works of Robert Martinson in support of that view. 1so A review of those texts, 1s 1 Martinson's subsequent work, 1s2 and more recent studies by other scholars 1s3
demonstrates that opponents of rehabilitation grossly overstated
the case against rehabilitation.
Martinson's article What Works? 1s4 was widely cited for
the view that "nothing works" to reduce criminal recidivism. m
Martinson's conclusion, however, was not that nothing works,
but that "[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative
their own purposes. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 17. Arguably, that is
exactly what has happened with recent efforts at sentencing reform. On the nature of the
political compromise that led to the federal sentencing guidelines, see Breyer, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1 (1988).
150. See sources cited supra note 102.
151. See generally D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON, & ]. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975);
Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PuB. INTEREST
22 (1974).
152. Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing
Reform, 7 HoFSTRA L. REv. 243 (1979).
IS3. See sources cited infra at notes 169-92.
IS4. Martinson, supra note 1S1, at 48.
ISS. See Martinson, supra note IS2, at 2S4 ("I protested at the slogan used by the
media to sum up what I said - 'nothing works.' "). More scholarly sources also quoted
Martinson for the view that rehabilitation did not work. See sources cited supra note 10S.
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efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable
effect on recidivism." 156 That conclusion was drawn from the
evaluative research that he and his co-authors examined in The
Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment . m In that work, they
concluded that "[w]hile some treatment programs have had
modest successes, it still must be concluded that the field of corrections has not as yet found satisfactory ways to reduce recidivism by significant amounts." 158
By the late 1970s, at a time when Martinson's work had
become influential in the debate about rehabilitation, Martinson
retracted the conclusions of his earlier research. In New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing
Reform, Martinson suggested that a different research procedure
from that used in his earlier works was necessary. 159 Evaluative
research, used in Effectiveness, aims to discover causal relationships between particular treatments and rehabilitation by comparing the effect of the treatment on an experimental group with
that of non-treatment on a control group. The researchers did
not vary the conditions under which the various treatment
methods were delivered. Both groups received standard processing and the experimental group received some additional form of
treatment. 160 Martinson originally concluded that treatment
added to the criminal-justice system did not reduce
recidivism. 161
His study in New Findings compared the reprocessing rates
of groups receiving experimental treatment with groups that
were similar but that received the standard treatment given to
the majority of offenders nationwide. 162 The new study was not
limited to evaluative research, and it included data from all postWorld War II research studies containing a verifiable reprocessing rate for a group of ten or more offenders.163
156. Martinson, supra note 151, at 25 (emphasis omitted).
157. D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON, & J . WILKS, supra note 151.
158. /d. at 627.
159. Martinson, supra note 152, at 252.
160. For a description of evaluative research, see D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON, & J.
WILKS, supra note 151, at 19.
161. Martinson, supra note 152, at 252-53 (citing D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON, & J.
WILKS, supra note 151, at 14-20).
162. /d. at 253.
163. /d. at 250. The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment was based on
information provided by 231 research studies completed between 1945 and 1967;
Martinson's article was based on information derived from 555 research studies published
between 1945 and 1978. Martinson, supra note 152, at 244 n.6, 252.
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Martinson concluded that no criminal treatment program
in use was inherently helpful or harmful. 164 In contrast to his
original works, Martinson was able to examine conditions under
which treatments had appreciable effects. The new study provided a reliable indication of the circumstances under which
treatment may have a substantial effect on reprocessing rates.
Martinson could thus predict which combinations of treatment
and other conditions were helpful, harmful, or neutral. 165
In New Findings, Martinson specifically denounced the
"nothing works" label often attributed to his writings. 166 Further, he urged sentencing reform on the basis of his new findings. 167 Characterizing the movement to abolish parole release
and supervision as "the most extreme case of radical tinkering
with the system of criminal justice," he urged that parole supervision be extended to more criminal offenders as part of a definite sentence because "[t]he evidence that parole supervision
works ... is more convincing than the bare assumption that it
does not." 168
Martinson's later work was not the only study that contradicted the dismal view of parole and rehabilitation which dominated the discussion about punishment. James Q. Wilson
criticized Martinson's earlier works for failing to identify patterns that emerged from his data. 169 Wilson argued that some
offenders are more amenable to treatment than others; hence,
treatment has a markedly different effect depending on the
offender's amenability to treatment. 17° Consistent research findings demonstrate that treatment programs tend to make "nonamenables" commit more crimes than they would have without
treatment. 171 Martinson's original studies showed no change in
offenders' behavior because any improvement in those amenable
to treatment was offset by the increased criminality of nonamenable offenders. 172 The success of a rehabilitative program would
164. Martinson, supra note 152, at 254.
165. /d. at 257-58.
166. /d. at 254.
167. /d. at 258. For a discussion of the correspondence between conditions of
treatment and patterns of reprocessing, both above and below the mean reprocessing rate
for standard treatments, see id. at 254-56.
168. /d. at 257 (emphasis in original).
169. Wilson, "What Works?" Revisited: New Findings on Criminal Rehabilitation, 61
PUB. INTEREST 3 (1980).
170. /d. at 8-9.
171. /d. at 8.
172. /d. at 11.
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depend on the ability of corrections officials to identify amenable
from nonamenable offenders. 173
Other researchers criticized Martinson's original works for
using an inappropriate measure of recidivism. Martinson
defined "recidivism rate" as "proportion who fail." 174 In a 1979
study, Charles Murray and Louis Cox contended that a more
appropriate understanding of recidivism would require focusing
not just on whether an offender committed an additional offense,
but also whether an offender continued to commit new crimes at
the same frequency after contact with the criminal justice
system. 175
The Murray and Cox study of juveniles found that about
eighty percent of the group studied were re-arrested during the
follow-up period. 176 That rate was not affected by the penalty
imposed. But re-arrest rates varied significantly. Wilson has
argued that the Murray and Cox study demonstrates that "how
strictly the youth were supervised . . . had the greatest effect on
the recidivism rate" and that "the more restrictive the degree of
supervision practiced . . . the greater the reduction in arrest
rates." 177
Other researchers have been able to identify offenders who
present a low risk of recidivism. James Bonta and Laurence
Motiuk have argued for improved classification and identification of low-risk offenders for diversion from overcrowded, highsecurity facilities into less crowded halfway houses. 178 Their recommendations were based on Canadian studies that relied on
Level of Supervision Inventory (LSI), an objective classification
system. 179 Initially developed in the late 1970s as a parole classification instrument and later adopted for inmate classification in
Ontario, the LSI compares favorably to other classification systems in reliability and validity. 180
Bonta and Motiuk suggested that the correctional system
173. /d. at 10.
174. /d. at 11.
175. C . MURRAY & L. Cox, BEYOND PROBATION: JUVENILE CoRRECTIONS AND
THE CHRONIC DELINQUENT (1979), reviewed by Wilson, supra note 169, at 10-14. For a
similar discussion, see D. GLASER, EVALUATION RESEARCH AND DECISION GUIDANCE

24-26 (1988).
176. C. MURRAY & L. Cox, supra note 175, at 42.
177. Wilson, supra note 169, at 13 (emphasis omitted).
178. Bonta & Motiuk, The Diversion of Incarcerated Offenders to Correctional
Halfway Houses, 24 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. ~02, 302 (1987).
179. /d. at 303.
180. /d. at 305.
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tends to overclassify offenders. 181 Overclassification has an unfavorable effect on low-risk offenders who "show a shift in
procriminal attitudes and behavior upon exposure to higher-risk
offenders in institutions." 182 Low-risk offenders placed in institutions ended up with higher re-incarceration rates than similar
low-risk offenders who were placed in halfway houses. Length
of incarceration also increased the risk of recidivism. The
authors concluded that "if we fail to divert low-risk inmates
from continued imprisonment we may actually increase the risk
for future recidivism." 183
Daniel Glaser has made a similar case for the use of actuarial statistical guidelines to assist corrections officials in deciding
inmate placement, in assessing readiness for parole release, and
in setting the level of supervision during probation and parole. 184
Glaser found that actuarial statistical research has consistently
yielded more accurate predictions than those made on the basis
of individual impressions by agency officials. 185
The federal sentencing commission rejected many of the
factors found to be reliable in actuarial statistical research. 186
Also, unlike the federal scheme, which rejected any post-conviction data, Glaser argued that the method could be used to estimate the probability of an offender's amenability to
rehabilitative programs, success or failure under reduced supervision, readiness for release, and post-release criminality. 187
Central to the argument against parole was the claim that
predictions of future dangerousness are notoriously inaccurate. 188 A prisoner's demonstrated change in attitude, which
may weigh in favor of parole, may "'be merely an insincere
attempt to curry favor with . . . the Parole Board . . . or just
another example of a recidivist prisoner's practice of getting
through a prison sentence . . . quickly and quietly . . . without
181. /d. at311.
182. /d. at 312.
183. /d.
184. See generally D. GLASER, supra note 175.
185. /d. at 3, 69-70.
186. The Federal Sentencing Commission found that a series of factors, like the
offender's age, education, vocational skills, family ties, and previous employment record
ordinarily are not relevant to the sentencing decision. UNITED STATES SENTENCING
CoMM'N, supra note 124, ch. 5, pt. H. Glaser argues that some of those factors are relevant
in predicting an offender's likely recidivism upon release. D. GLASER, supra note 175, at
70.
187. /d. at 70.
188. See supra notes 77-83, 121 and accompanying text.
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any real intention of avoiding crime on release.' " 189 In response
to that criticism, Glaser has argued that periods of reduced
supervision-like that provided by parole or by incarceration in
a halfway house-allow for an adequate test to predict future
criminality. He argues that this is true because "the subject,
although still somewhat constrained, is exposed to the temptations and opportunities for misconduct in the free
community." 190
Results from Wisconsin's parole system support Glaser's
argument. Using a set of assessment factors, parole officials
determine the parolee's risk level and, based on the score, place
him into a high, medium, or low supervision group. Reported
crime and misconduct rates declined significantly, even for highrisk parolees as long as they were strictly supervised. 191 Wisconsin parole officials also assess parolees' needs as related to risk of
recidivism. That scale, developed through extensive consultation between researchers and experienced agents, was designed
to determine how well the needs that most affect criminal
propensities have been met. The study of the Wisconsin system
suggests that when parolees' needs were met, they were less
likely to commit additional crimes. 192
In the early and middle 1970s, based on then-current studies, one might have argued that rehabilitation was ineffective.
Efforts at sentencing reform, underway since the 1970s, proceeded on that assumption. Ironically, by the time Congress
enacted sentencing reform, new studies were available that
should have made reformers rethink their attack on rehabilitation. Apart from past mistakes, legislatures and commentators
ought to rethink the rehabilitation question based on more
recent studies. More sophisticated research techniques demonstrate that some offenders are amenable to rehabilitation and
that social scientists can identify those offenders by use of objective criteria, at least some of which relate to post-conviction
behavior.

189. Metchik, Parole Decisionmaking, 32 INT' L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.
(quoting 1979 REPORT OF T HE PAROLE BOARD FOR

CRIMINOLOGY 233, 243 (1988)
ENGLAND AND WALES 32).

190. D. GLASER, supra note 175, at 151.
191. /d. at 132.
192. Id. at 128-30.
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B.

Rethinking the Philosophical Attack on Rehabilitation

1.

Confusion Over the Rehabilitative Model

I do not intend to canvass all of the different philosophical
arguments for a just-deserts or retributive model or to assess the
background assumptions about the criminal law. Instead, even
conceding the underlying assumptions of the just-deserts model,
I want to argue that rehabilitation and parole are not inconsistent with that position.
Apart from grave concerns about the actual performance of
the rehabilitative model, critics, like the drafters of Doing Justice, argued that punishment is deserved. 193 Their model, moralistic and judgmental, is premised on the argument that actors
are blameworthy because they are capable of choosing whether
to commit a crime. 194 That an actor may have great difficulty
conforming his behavior to the requirements of the criminal law
because of causes beyond his control does not prevent moral
condemnation. Condemnation is appropriate as long as the
actor is capable of rational judgment, even if that judgment is
overcome during the commission of the offender's crime. 195
Critics characterized the rehabilitative model as deterministic and medical, inconsistent with the moral judgments of the
criminal law. Attempts to treat and to cure the "sick" offender
were seen as misguided efforts based on mercy and leniency. 196
That a person deserved to be punished cast doubt on the morality of excusing his conduct. 197 Initially, the arguments against
the rehabilitative model started from the erroneous premise that
it was synonymous with the medical model that predominated
during the 1950s and 1960s. In the post-World War II era, the
"mental hygiene movement" cast rehabilitation in the medical
framework. 198 But rehabilitation has a much longer history than
its modem medical variation.
The debate between proponents of retributive justice and
rehabilitation has roots dating back at least to the colonial
period. In Puritan America, the law was used to advance the
193. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 54, 69-73.
194. Id. at 44.
195. See also S. Kadish, supra note 54, at 98-105; Morse, The Twilight of Welfare
Criminology: A Reply to Judge Daze/on, 49 S. CAL L. REV. 1247, 1248-54 (1976).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 97-110.
197. See generally Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice , in PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 1-14
(J. Coleman & E. Paul eds. 1987).
198. F. ALLEN, supra note 20, at 5.
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dominant religious beliefs and to enforce "proper standards of
moral behavior." 199 Based on the Calvinist belief in the innate
depravity of human beings, the criminal law served to keep people from temptation. Punishment was not intended to save the
criminal; because humans were inherently sinful, only God
could save them. Punishment served to keep the rest of the community from temptation. The law, as God's word enacted on
earth, gave the Puritans the right to represent God's justice by
punishing criminals. 200
Quaker views contrasted sharply with the Puritan conception of the criminal law. Early in our history, the Quakers led a
movement away from capital and corporal punishment to a system of workhouses and prisons. Viewed as grim in retrospect,
that system was generally enlightened by comparison to earlier
treatment of criminals. 201 At root, it was based on an optimism
about human capacity for transformation. 202
Like proponents of the medical model, Quakers believed
that crime was the product of society, rather than a result of
inherent sinfulness.203 But the method chosen for transformation was not "treatment." Instead, they believed that the
offender could be reformed through a process of rationality.
Freed from the corrupting influences and permitted to reflect on
moral questions, the offender could be "restored to fellowship
with God and humanity." 204
Around the time of the American Revolution and the adoption of the Constitution, Quaker idealism was a powerful force in
penology. It led to the establishment of penitentiaries, first in
Pennsylvania where Quaker influence was strongest. Modeled
on monastic prisons of the Middle Ages, the penitentiary used
solitary confinement, religious instruction, and hard labor to
facilitate repentance. 205
Early prison reformers also stressed the community's
responsibility for corrupting the individual. For example, one
Boston clergyman inquired, " 'How can it be justice to punish as
a crime that which the institutions of society render unavoida199.
200.
201.
202.
18, at 16.
203.
204.
205.

G.
Jd.

McHUGH, CHRISTIAN FAITH AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

at 33-34.
FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT,

32-33 (1978).

supra note 4, at 85-86.
Id.; see also F. A L L EN , supra note 20, at 13; STRUGGLE FOR JusTICE, supra note
G.

McHu GH,

Id.
Id.

at

36-39.

supra

note

199,

at

34-35.
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ble?' " 206 Recognition that social conditions were a cause of
crime did not render society incapable of punishing the offender,
but it created a moral imperative to offer the offender a chance at
moral transformation. Nor was the prescription mollycoddling;
devices that look unabashedly punitive, like hard labor, were
believed to have the beneficial effect of aiding the transformation
of the offender. 207
2.

Suffering, Retribution, and Rehabilitation

Whether public officials ought to adopt one vision of punishment over another should depend ultimately on the merits of
the argument. But I want to speculate in this subsection on the
yearnings that help to explain, if not justify, the attraction of a
just-deserts or retributive model. Human beings yearn for divine
or cosmic justice-! think that rehabilitation is based on similar
hopes.
Retribution has primitive roots. For example, Paul
Ricoeur, philosopher and cultural anthropologist, suggests that
primitive societies saw what he calls defilement, forms of human
suffering, in moral terms. 208 Pain and suffering in such societies
are interpreted in quasi-moral terms: "Ethics is mingled with
the physics of suffering, while suffering is surcharged with ethical meanings. " 209
Human suffering in our modem view has no obvious relationship to human intent or to human causality-one may suffer
a bad fate for no understandable reason. But Ricoeur suggests
that if suffering and pain are not interpreted as punishment, our
suffering is meaningless and our world view is without reason or
control: "When [humankind] first wished to express the order in
the world, [it] began by expressing it in the language of retribution."210 The search for moral causality thus preceded the
search for physical causality.
Within the religious context, either suffering is related to
human worth, or God (or the holy reality) is unjust or capricious. The challenge for the faithful is to explain God's good206. F. ALLEN, supra note 20, at 14 (quotin g H . SACKS & C. LoGAN, DOES PAROLE
MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 80 (1979) (quotin g Boston clergyman T h eodore Parker)).
207. G. McHUGH, supra n ote 199, at 39-41; see a/so C. T HOMAS, C ORRECTIONS IN
AMERICA: PROBLEMS OF THE PAST AND THE PRESENT 65 ( 1987).
208. P . RICOEUR, T HE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL 26-27 (1967).
209. Id. at 3 1.
210. /d. at 30.
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ness and at the same time to explain how the evil prosper and
the just suffer. 211
This tension is reflected in the Book of Job in which Bildad,
Job's comforter, responds when Job suggests that his suffering is
out of proportion to his guilt:
Does God pervert justice? Or does the Almighty pervert the
right? If your children have sinned against him, he has delivered them into the power of their transgression. If you will
seek God and make supplication to the Almighty, if you are
pure and upright, then surely he will rouse himself for you and
reward you with a rightful habitation. 212

Bildad thus urges that the pure and upright will in fact receive
rightful habitation. To believe that the just prosper and the
wicked suffer required that the Israelites deny the reality of
much of their experience. But if the just prosper, they could
avoid the conclusion that God was unjust or indifferent to
human suffering.
Christianity faces a similar challenge, to explain the death
of Christ without calling into question the goodness of God. If
Jesus dies as vicarious punishment for human sin, Jesus's
message of the loving God is false. Christian thinkers explain
the death of Jesus in radically different ways. 213 But at a minimum, the event must be explained, as must all suffering, in a
way that allows order in the world and security and hope: "Man
confessed this ineluctability [of moral causality in the universe]
long before he recognized the regularity of the natural order." 214
For many, retribution or just deserts is tied up with that
desire for moral order. Even if one agrees that Job's fate in this
life was unjust, there is hope for an accounting in the afterlife.
211. The same problem, responding to the idea that the evil man prospe~ and the
just man suffers, must be answered in all religions. For example, the doctrine of "karma,"
the Hindu and Buddhist teaching about moral causality, preserves for Indian thought
moral rationality in the universe. Suffering in this life is because of evil deeds in a former
life, and a higher caste in the next life will be the reward for good deeds in this life. The
need to interpret one's fate in terms of moral causality is a cardinal principle of Hindu
thought. Pugh, Astrology and Fate: Hindu and Muslim Experiences, in KARMA: AN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL INQUIRY 138 (C. Keyes & E. Daniel eds. 1983). While it helps to
rationalize the status quo, it must reflect a profound yearning for moral order and justice in
the universe to have survived in India with such tenacity for 2600 years.
212. Job 8:3-6 (New Oxford Annotated).
213. See P. RtCOEUR, supra note 208, at 325; see also Gregson, The Faces of Evil and
Our Response: Ricoeur, Lonergan, Moore, in RELIGION IN CONTEXT (T. Fallon & P. Riley
eds. 1988).
214. P. RICOEUR, supra note 208, at 30.
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Ricoeur argues that the failure to find meaning in suffering in
this life led us to look elsewhere for that accounting, "whether at
the end of history, in a Last Judgment, or in some exceptional
event, such as the sacrifice of a victim offered for the sins of the
world." 215 He explicitly argues that our retributive penal philosophy comes out of the same need for explaining human
suffering:
conscience, not finding the manifestation of the law of retribution any longer in real suffering, looked for its satisfaction in
other directions, whether ... by means of penal laws elaborated
by society with the intention of making the penalty proportionate to the crime, or by means of a wholly internal penalty,
accepted as penance.2 16

The penal law thus parallels our hope for more lasting justice. While the law has never attempted to reward the good, it at
least attempts to punish the evildoer according to his deserts.
Retributive justice is based on the premise that we are free moral
agents and that punishment is appropriate for wrong moral
choices. 217 At least as early as the twelfth century, that notion of
punishment was formalized as part of the canon law. 218
A philosophy of just deserts thus responds to one of our
most profound yearnings: a need to understand human suffering. But the hope for human transformation, or for our capacity
to overcome our own failure or sin, is a similarly profound
theme in religion and philosophy.
Judaism, for example, "does not overlook the fact ofsin." 219
Because we are not merely part of nature, because we have open
to us "the infinite and indeterminate possibilities of [our] freedom, " 220 we are capable of moral evil, "the dreadful ills inflicted
by man upon himself and his fellow-men. " 221 While recognizing
that we are finite and flawed, Judaism is not hopelessly
pessimistic.
At the core of Judaism is the fellowship between God and
man. Sin creates a barrier between man and God.222 But
through repentance and atonement, we can regain fellowship
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

/d. at 42.
/d. (emphasis in original).
M. WALZER, EXODUS AND REVOLUTION

83 (1985).

G. McHUGH, supra note 199, at 22.
W . HERBERG, JUDAISM AND MODERN MAN

/d. at 72.
/d. at 73.
/d. cbs. 8, 11.

73 (1951).
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with God. Salvation in Judaism does not await our death. 22 3
Instead, it is achieved when we abandon our "delusive self-sufficiency so as to tum to God" and when God gives us "the power
to break the vicious circle of sin and tum to the divine source of
[our] being." 224
Judaism is paradoxical on the nature of salvation, for God
is both Judge and Father, dispenser of justice and mercy. Two
recurring questions must be answered. Do we earn God's forgiveness and grace; that is, God as giver of justice suggests as
much. Or, as forgiving and loving Father, does God give us His
grace without regard to our deserts?225 If so, does it cheapen
God's grace and make it available to the undeserving? The
answer appears paradoxical or at least involves some mix of
mercy and justice. The sinner must repent; the sinner must
overcome the delusion of self-sufficiency and, in that sense, he
must ready himself for God's grace. But "[i]t is God who
saves." "In the final analysis, despite the initiative and activity
required of him, man cannot save himself; .. . God, the divine
spirit goes out to meet and to purge [the repentant sinner]." 226
The process of atonement is at the core of Judaism. Atonement is a form of new beginning, " 'the creation of a new being,
a sort of being who is born again, the breaking of the barrier
between sinful man and his Maker.' " 227 In an honest recognition of human frailty, Judaism recognizes that once we have
atoned, we will become self-absorbed again and need to return to
God's grace. It is a battle that must be constantly refought.228
Christian theologians struggle with the same dilemma concerning God's grace. While the concept of redemption is fundamental throughout Christianity, denominations and theologians
differ on how this concept works itself out within the context of
life on earth. Problems arise when they attempt to develop the
relationship between grace, redemption, and punishment.229
223. /d. at 123-26.
224. /d. at 121.
225. /d. at 122-23.
226. /d. at 123.
227. /d. at 125 (quoting C.G . MONTEFIORE & H. LoEWE, A RABBINIC ANTHOLOGY
230 (1938)).
228. /d. at 126.
229. For example, early Christianity, influenced by the Old Testament tradition,
emphasized relationship to the community. It demonstrated concern for the spiritual
implications of the offense as against the "soul" of the community. The Christian society
sought the offender's reconciliation with both God and the community. G . McHUGH,
supra note 199, at 15. Despite Augustine's emphasis on the city of God separate from the
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Christianity accepts the premise that the individual who
sins can be reconciled with God and society. The Gospel imperative, to "love one's enemies," implies that to consider someone
as an enemy is not wrong, and may even be an appropriate
response to that person's criminal and sinful actions. Nonetheless, the concept of enmity implies the possibility of reconciliation. "[T]o consider people who commit crimes as enemies .. . ,
rather than as 'criminals' . . . , is to presuppose that they and
society can be reconciled; ... that their relationship can change
from one of opposition and conflict to one of solidarity and
peace. " 230 Loving one's enemy does not prevent Christian society from punishing the wrongdoer, but rather requires that
Christians keep open the possibility of the criminal's eventual
reconciliation with that society.
Implicit in Jesus becoming a man is the notion that God's
covenant, the promise of redemption, is open to all humanity.
In Wolfhart Pannenberg's words, "[t]hrough the message of
Jesus, God gives to humans the assurance of fellowship with
him, the fulfillment of their destiny, their salvation. But it is
basic that he gives it to everyone .... " 231 As in Judaism, that
fact creates a central tension in Christian doctrine. If redemption is available to all, it is not earned.
For some theologians, repentance is a necessary condition
for redemption. That is how we experience God's grace at work
in human life. For example, Hendrikus Berkof has argued:
The knowledge of grace and the knowledge of sin go
together; they presuppose and reinforce each other. Without
repentance ... the gospel is changed from a marvelous message
earthly city, he recognized the relevance of Christianity to decisionmaking in the earthly
city: " 'Fulfill, Christian judge, the duty of an atfectionate father; let your indignation
against their crimes be tempered by considerations of humanity ... .'" /d. at 19 (quoting
Letter from Augustine to Marcellinus (A.D. 412), in 1 The Confessions and Letters of St.
Augustine, Letter CXXXIII, in Ambrose, Duties of the Clergy, in 10 NICENE AND POSTNICENE FATHERS 470-71 (P. Schatf & J. Wace eds. 1896)). The judge should not seek
revenge, but should " 'be moved by the wounds [the otfenders' crimes] have inflicted on
their own souls to exercise a desire to heal them.' " Jd. Other Christians have not been as
concerned with the otfender as with social order. While John Calvin believed that the
purpose of the state and the law was to promote " 'the religious purpose of the maintenance
of the true religion,'" id. at 25 (substantially quoting 2 E. TROELTSCH, THE SOCIAL
TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES 615 (0. Wyon trans. 1931)), punishment did
not serve a role in redemption because humans were inherently sinful and could be saved
only by God. Nothing in human experience could bring about redemption. See J.
GUSTAFSON, THEOLOGY AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 172-73 ( 1974).
230. G. MCHUGH, supra note 199, at 148.
231. W. PANNENBERG, ETHICS 51 (trans. 1981).
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of liberation into a more or less self-evident ideology of cheap
grace. If repentance falls away, the amazement and joy over
God's free grace also fall away.232

Grace without repentance is "cheap" grace; repentance is "the
abiding undertone of all the Christian life. " 233 Free grace cannot
be received until individuals have readied themselves through
repentance.
Judaism and Christianity must struggle with the same question: given universal human frailty, are we capable of salvation?
Although individual religions often hold out preconditions, like
membership in their religious group, the possibility of grace is
open to all. No one can avoid sin. All may repent. 234 The availability of salvation makes religion enormously powerful and
appealing to its adherents.
At this juncture, I should make clear that I am not urging
that our system should give special recognition to prisoners who
find Jesus or religion during their incarceration. Anyone familiar with prisons knows that "conversions," especially if finding
Jesus may impress the parole board, are quite common and often
quite meaningless as a measure of transformation. 235 In fact,
urging that the state give special recognition to religious conversions would raise obvious establishment clause problems.
I have attempted instead to demonstrate that the rehabilitative model finds support in many sources other than the modem
medical deterministic view of behavior. 236 I also have attempted
to suggest an analogy between the rehabilitative model and the
powerful religious themes of salvation and redemption. At the
core of the two predominant religious beliefs in this country is
the view of man as sinner, yet capable of returning to grace. 237 I
would like to see that same model preserved within our view of
punishment.
232. H. BERKHOF, CHRISTIAN FAITH 433 (trans. 1985) (emphasis omitted).
233. /d.
234. See 4 K. BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS: THE DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION
18 (1956).
235. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 88-89 (discussing prisoner
cynicism and shamming to impress parole officials).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 198-207.
237. I have focused on our religious traditions in part because of recent re-assertion
of those values in our public debate. See Mack, Liberalism, Neutralism, and Rights, in
RELIGION, MORALITY AND THE LAW 46 (J.R. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1988). I
believe that secular humanists demonstrate similar faith in the capacity for human
transformation and moral development. See, e.g., B. RuSSELL, What is an Agnostic?, in
BERTRAND RUSSELL ON Goo AND RELIGION 76-77 (A. Seckel ed. 1986).
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A False Dichotomy: Rehabilitation and Just Deserts

At this point, one might expect a rehabilitation of rehabilitation which urges that, even though inconsistent with notions
of just deserts, retribution should be scrapped in favor of a rehabilitative model. I am not going to make that argument.
Instead, I want to argue for a more modest position: that a
criminal is transformed through punishment is relevant to how
much punishment the offender deserves.
To rehabilitate rehabilitation as a justification for punishment is to answer a different question than the one I want to
pose in this section of the Article. Much of the criticism of the
rehabilitative model over the past fifteen years attempted to
show that it is inappropriate to imprison in order to rehabilitate. 238 We imprison in order to punish because the offender
deserves the punishment. 239 Even if it is inappropriate to incarcerate to rehabilitate, it does not follow that we should continue
to punish the prisoner who demonstrates a transformation.
Supporters of the just-deserts model suggest that because
punishment is deserved, relieving an offender from serving part
of his sentence demonstrates mercy and not justice.240 Three
important premises are hidden in that argument: that just
deserts can be quantified; that mercy may be morally inappropriate; and that a prisoner's response to punishment is irrelevant to
how much punishment he deserves.
Prior to the penitentiary movement, when we were willing
to punish the offender in kind, 241 one might more readily identify
238. See, e.g., United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 498-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(emphasis in original):
The court agrees that this defendant should not be sent to prison for
"rehabilitation." ... [T]his court shares the growing understanding that no one
should ever be sent to prison/or rehabilitation. That is to say, nobody who would
not otherwise be locked up should suffer that fate on the incongruous premise
that it will be good for him or her. Imprisonment is punishment. . . . But the goal
of rehabilitation cannot fairly serve in itself as grounds for the sentence to
confinement.
239. See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 66-76.
240. See, e.g., Gaylin & Rothman, supra note II , at xxxvi-xxxix.
24 I. See M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 44-45 (A. Sheridan trans. 1977):
There was the use of 'symbolic' torture in which the forms of the execution
referred to the nature of the crime: the tongues of blasphemers were pierced, the
impure were burnt, the right hand of murderers was cut off; sometimes the
condemned man was made to carry the instrument of his crime ....
There were even some cases of an almost theatrical reproduction of the crime
in the execution of the guilty man-with the same instruments, the same gestures.
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the punishment deserved by the offender: the eye for an eye
might make sense at least in a case in which the offender did
violence to the victim and the offender was lashed in retaliation.
Even that is problematic. What if, for example, a violent and
hardened offender emotionally terrorized his victim, but only
struck her once? Even if we were to accept punishment in kind,
we would have difficulty determining what the precisely
equivalent punishment would be. 242
Obviously, when we imprison in order to punish or use
other forms of deprivation, the quantification of the deserved
punishment becomes at best a rough approximation. 243 Initially,
proponents of just deserts and retribution generally disagree on
what the relevant factors are in assessing the deserved punishment. 244 Once past that difficult assessment, they also disagree
wildly on the appropriate length of prison sentences. 245 Most
proponents of just deserts, though, recognize that a wide array
of factors help to determine the deserved punishment.
Harm alone is an insufficient measure of the punishment
deserved. 246 At a minimum, mens rea is relevant. 247 But beyond
that, our law has traditionally recognized a variety of offender
characteristics that are relevant to the offender's culpability. 248
242. Even Immanuel Kant, generally associated with a strong retributivist position,
argued against full equivalency of crime and punishment. Thus in The Philosophy of Law,
Kant argued that while a murderer should be executed, "[h]is death ... must be kept free
from all maltreatment that would make the humanity suffering in his person loathsome or
abominable." I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY Of LAW (W. Hastie trans. 1887), reprinted inS.
KADISH & S. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 138 (1989).
243. See L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 217-18 (1987). Responding to
the argument that retributive theory offers no definite guidelines for determining what
punishment fits each crime, Weinreb recognizes that desert is "insistently individual." /d.
at 211. As a result, sentencing laws will necessarily be only dull approximations of the
desert of each criminal.
244. See R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 11-34.
245. /d. at xvi-xvii (discussing different legislative responses to the "commensurate
deserts" "rallying cry"), 137-94 (reviewing variety of state legislative responses).
246. /d. at 24-27; see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (in assessing whether
punishment is grossly disproportionate to the offense, the Court considers a balance of the
harm caused by the offender and the offender's culpability). For a compelling argument
that the actual harm resulting does not correspond to the offender's blameworthiness, see
generally Schulhofer, supra note 107.
247. Professor Singer has argued that mens rea ought to be the controlling question
on the offender's culpability. He rejects the idea that the law should inquire into additional
characteristics of the offender. R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 18-24. His views contrast
sharply with, for example, those of Professor Weinreb, who argues that the process of
assessing an offender's desert is infinitely complex according to the unique and subtle
pattern of the offender's personal history. L. WEINREB, supra note 243, at 217-18.
248. L. WEINREB, supra note 243, at 217-18.
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In urging the abandonment of parole, proponents of just deserts
argued that postincarceration changes were irrelevant to just
deserts. 249
One might argue that because we cannot say with precision
what punishment is deserved, a parole system for rehabilitated
offenders gives us the flexibility to rethink our earlier, overly
punitive attitude towards the offender. Early release of the
offender, however, might appear to be an act of mercy. Some
proponents of just deserts have argued that such an act of mercy
is inconsistent with a philosophy of deserved punishment. 250
Our attitude towards criminal offenders, especially violent
offenders, has begun to change in part because we have begun to
hear the voices of their victims more clearly than we once did. 251
Feminists and others concerned with family violence and violence directed against women help to identify quite dramatically
some of the moral concerns raised by forgiveness and mercy
when we excuse an offender from serving the full punishment
that he has deserved. 252
I want to draw an analogy between an abusive spouse and a
violent offender who, if early release from detention is considered an act of mercy, is released from custody before he has paid
his debt and so has not been punished according to his just
deserts. Within an abusive relationship, the abused wife is usually faced with increasing episodes of violence. After the first
violent encounter, the abuser is contrite and promises never to
harm his wife again. Confronted by the loving mate whom she
may remember from courtship and whom she is acculturated to
forgive, she does not leave the marriage, but recommits herself
to the relationship. In so doing, she has psychologically reinforced the abuser's violent behavior. 253 At a cognitive level, the
message to the abuser may be quite cynical. He has devalued his
wife through victimizing her and he has gotten away with it.
The abusive spouse has not been punished consistent with
his just deserts. Violence within the relationship escalates and
may lead to death. The show of mercy and forgiveness was part
249.
250.
25 l.
252.

See supra text accompanying notes 59-65, 105-11, 189.
See, e.g., Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 11, at xxxvi-xxxix.
See sources cited supra note 62.
L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATIERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW
SOCIETY RESPONDS 42-47 (1989) (describing cycle of violence in battering-spouse
relationship, including the woman's yearning for rediscovery of the "good" man she
originally married).
253. /d.
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of the cycle of violence. It was morally inappropriate because it
reflected the lack of value of the abuser's victim. Failing to punish out of mercy and forgiveness is pragmatically and philosophically bankrupt in my example.
In Mercy and Legal Justice, Jeffrie Murphy has argued that
the exercise of mercy may be immoral. 2 s4 "To be merciful to a
person requires not merely that one change how one feels about
that person but, also, requires a specific kind of action (or omission) - namely, treating that person less harshly than, in the
absence of the mercy, one would have treated him." 2 ss Mercy
involves the departure from justice and so viewed, is unjust, the
product of dangerous sentimentality. 2s 6 Mercy is also unjust
when it leads us to treat like cases differently. But factors relating to an offender's culpability are morally relevant in assessing
whether we are dealing with like cases. 2 s7
I think that a person's response to punishment is a morally
appropriate factor in determining how much punishment to
inflict on the offender. Philosopher Jean Hampton has characterized the relationship between offender and victim as follows:
By victimizing me, the wrongdoer has declared himself elevated with respect to me, acting as a superior who is permitted
to use me for his purposes. A false moral claim has been made.
Moral reality has been denied.2 s 8

Proportionate punishment is important to correct that false
claim: "retributive punishment is the defeat of the wrongdoer at
the hands of the victim ... that symbolizes the correct relative
value of wrongdoer and victim." 2 s9
If that is the retributivist's understanding of the purpose of
punishment, he should recognize the relevance of the offender's
transformation or reform. It suggests that there is no independent value to compelling a person to submit to a certain amount
of punishment. Instead, punishment is to serve as a means of
declaring or realigning relative moral worth.
I argued above that we make only a rough approximation
about what punishment fits the crime.260 But even more impor254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Murphy, supra note 197, at 2-6.
!d. at 4.
Jd. at 4-5.
Jd. at 6-7.
Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FoRGIVENESS
!d.
See supra text accompanying notes 241-45.

AND MERCY

125 (1988).
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tantly, if punishment is to serve as a way to re-establish relative
moral worth of victim and offender, the length of punishment
may vary according to the offender's response to punishment.
Even a short period of punishment may bring about the
offender's recognition of the false moral claim that he has made.
He may internalize the appropriateness of his being punished
and may genuinely have atoned for his offense. 261
I offer two possible transformed offenders. Metaphorically,
the transformed offender becomes a new person. If the offender
becomes truly a new person, "it is obviously a matter of justice
that one not [continue to] punish one person for the crime of
another." 262 I do not want to overemphasize the new-person
metaphor. More probably, transformed prisoners are ones who
grow up and are now more capable of mature moral reflection.
They are the same, but a more developed, person. Yet in that
instance, if the transformation has resulted from incarceration or
other coercive intervention by the state, the offender has internalized the recognition of his false moral claim and has earned a
right to request our forgiveness and mercy.263 To continue to
impose suffering on a transformed human being seems exces261. At this juncture, if we recognize purposes of punishment in addition to
retribution, we might want to incarcerate an offender past the point of his atonement to
serve those additional goals. Alternatively, one might want to condition release on parole
supervision to assure that the offender indeed has genuinely been reformed. My colleague
David Gruning suggested an interesting dilemma: does a reformed prisoner demonstrate
his transformation by accepting the justice of his punishment? If so, then how can one
argue for early release of the offender? I agree that part of our motive in punishing is to
effect the prisoner's acceptance of his own guilt and the justice of some punishment. But
that is a separate question from whether he must accept the full punishment, often an
extremely long term of imprisonment. See, e.g, Terrebonne v. Butler, 848 F.2d 500 (5th
Cir. 1988) (en bane) (life imprisonment without benefit of parole for distribution of small
quantity of heroin).
262. Murphy, supra note 197, at 9. (Murphy, though, expresses suspicion about
"'new person' talk.") In commenting on a draft of this Article, Professor Schulhofer asked
whether a court could not then consider a defendant's prior crime after he had become a
"new person." That the defendant continues to commit crimes may be evidence that we
were wrong in our assessment that he has become a new person. It is also worth noting
that the law of evidence (the common-law rule making inadmissible an accused's prior
criminal acts to show a propensity to commit crime) is premised on the optimistic view of
our capacity for transformation. The rule has been explained as follows:
It has to do with the optimistic belief, fundamental in our social system that
people are not necessarily limited by their past acts, that the criminal can reform,
and that once a criminal has " paid his debt to society" he should be taken for all
purposes as an upstanding member of society ....
R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 219 (2d ed. 1983).
263. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 255-59.
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sively cruel. 264
I have not argued that we impose punishment solely for the
benefit of the offender. Instead, I have argued that human transformation occurs sometimes in the institutional setting or as a
result of another less restrictive setting that is nonetheless a form
of punishment. 265 My argument is that when tranformation
occurs it is difficult to find a continued justification for imposing
suffering on that offender.
C

The Problem of Inequality

One of the most powerful objections to the rehabilitative
model was that its reliance on indeterminate sentences led to inequality.266 In this section, I must respond to obvious concerns
that re-introducing consideration of a prisoner's postincarceration behavior may lead to the same inequity. Critics were concerned about different aspects of inequality. Commentators did
not urge that the punishment for the same offense must necessarily be the same, but instead they argued that the offender's culpability is relevant to his just deserts. 267
Once analysis focuses on the culpability of the criminal
offender instead of exclusively on the harm done, two offenders
who commit the same crime may appropriately be treated differently. 268 In effect, we cannot conclude that two offenders have
been treated unequally until we decide what factors are relevant
to how much punishment is appropriate. The equality question
cannot be answered until we resolve the question about why we
punish. And for those who urge that punishment relates to culpability, punishment will vary from offender to offender.269 For
264. I think that insight underlies the emotional and moral force of classical tragic
theater. For example, in Shakespeare's King Lear, reprinted in W. SHAKESPEARE, KING
LEAR (K. Muir 9th ed. 1972), we first are outraged at his inhumane treatment of his
daughter Cordelia. But what moves us and makes us grieve Lear's death is that he has
finally understood and accepted his own moral responsibility.
265. People who work closely with prisoners and ex-convicts certainly report
instances of genuine human transformation. See, e.g. , Kell, At S.F. Center, Ex-Cons
Rebuild Desparate Lives, The Sacramento Bee, Feb. 5, 1990, at I, col. 5; Eig, Board Asks
Roemer to Spare Killer, The Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Nov. 28, 1989, at Bl, col. 5.
266. See M. FRANKEL, supra note I, ch. 2; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 27-32.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 244-48.
268. But see R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 18-24, 27-31 , 35-39. Singer argues that the
offender's mens rea is the only relevant consideration to assessing culpability. That is
hardly the prevailing view. See, e.g., FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 4, at
37-47 (identifying relevant factors).
269. See, e.g., L. WEINREB, supra note 243, at 211.
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example, even while abandoning parole, the federal Sentencing
Guidelines consider whether an offender demonstrates an acceptance of responsibility significant. 270
Most commentators who urged the abandonment of indeterminate sentencing recognized that conclusion. 271 Some variation in sentencing was appropriate, but indeterminate sentencing
was unequal in part because it had no relationship to just
deserts. 272 But the most important concern expressed by critics
of indeterminate sentencing was the arbitrary, unguided discretion given to both sentencing judges and parole boards. 273
I have argued earlier in this Article that an offender's transformation, like his culpability, is relevant to morally appropriate
punishment. 274 If that conclusion is sound, then consideration
of an offender's transformation is not impermissible on equality
grounds.
Much of the doubt about using postincarceration behavior
as a measure of release date turned on doubts about our ability
to identify genuine human transformation275 and about the bias
and unfair treatment based on inappropriate factors like the prisoner's race. 276 Here, I am cautiously optimistic that we can
articulate objective standards to guide parole board determinations. As discussed earlier in this Article, research over the past
270. UNITED STATES SENTENCING CoMM'N, supra note 124, § 3El.l. The Mode)
Penal Code (MPC) definition of "criminal attempt" offers another illustration when society
recognizes an offender's conduct, after the commission of the crime, as relevant to the
amount of punishment he deserves. Indeed, under the MPC approach, a defendant whose
" conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt" has an affirmative defense if he can
demonstrate that he made "a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal
purpose." MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (1985). Under the MPC, a defendant is not
guilty if he has a change of heart immediately after attempting to commit a crime. Under
the Sentencing Guidelines, he may reduce his punishment if he demonstrates remorse at the
time of his sentencing. But by abandoning the opportunity for parole, society rejects the
relevance of a prisoner's change of heart when it comes later rather than earlier in the
proceedings.
271. See, e.g. , M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, ch. 9 (urging weights to be given to a wide
range of relevant factors); FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 4, at 37-48
(examination of the crime of armed robbery to demonstrate factors relevant to assessing
punishment); A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 80-82 (discussing some considerations
relevant to offender culpability).
272. See, e.g. , Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 11, at xxxix.
273. M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 103-04 (suggesting that indeterminate sentencing
as administered was sufficiently arbitrary to raise due process concerns).
274. See supra text accompanying notes 262-64.
275. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 19-26 (raising concerns about ability to predict
future dangerousness).
276. See, e.g., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 71-72 (criminal justice
system is dominated by racism and cultural and class bias).
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decade suggests that our earlier conclusions about recidivism,
parole, and rehabilitation were unnecessarily pessimistic. A
growing literature suggests that actuarial statistics lead to
acceptably accurate predictions about an offender's likely
recidivism. 277
V.

CONCLUSIONS

I believe that rethinking rehabilitation and parole is timely.
Popular perception about our need for severe punishment may
reduce the political will for reform. But faced with the unacceptable cost of creating new prison facilities, we may be ready
to consider a wide variety of alternatives to bricks and mortar.
I have not urged that we merely forget the debate of the
past twenty years and re-introduce a medical, rehabilitative
model. Instead, I have tried to rehabilitate rehabilitation and
parole within the confines of the just-deserts model that is widely
accepted today. Conceding that the criminal law is moralistic
and judgmental, I have argued that the primary arguments
against the rehabilitative model must be rethought.
First, insofar as the model was rejected because of the
widely held belief that rehabilitation did not work, more recent
research suggests that position was wrong. Earlier researchers
were asking the wrong questions. More subtle examination of
the data suggests that some programs do work well and that
more sophisticated criteria are available to determine who may
benefit from different kinds of rehabilitative programs.
Second, even if rehabilitation works, we might rightly reject
it if it is morally or philosophically inappropriate. I have
attempted to demonstrate that transformation or atonement, at
the core of our religious traditions, does relate to how much
punishment should be meted out to an offender.
Third, equality is not offended if we determine the amount
of punishment deserved based on morally relevant criteria. If
my second conclusion is correct, then it is appropriate to treat
two offenders differently depending on their response to punishment. I have also argued tentatively that new research properly
implemented as parole guidelines will allow parole decisions to
be made objectively and without discrimination.
Finally, I want to urge a return to the optimism of earlier
reformers who believed in human goodness and capacity for
277. See supra text accompanying notes 179-85.
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transformation. I do not urge that all offenders are capable of
reform, but I would urge us to return to criminal offenders hope
that their own efforts in prison can lead to renewal.

